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ABSTRACT
This paper provides the foundations ofa general theory of information
and the capital market.
We show that in a pure gambling market,even with asymmetric information,
there cannot exist an equilibrium with trade withrational individuals.
We argue that although a pure exchange stockmarket is not a pure gambling
market, most of the trade on the stock market arises fromirrationality
onthe part of some investors and the rationalresponse on the part of
other investors to take advantage of thatirrationality.
We show thatthe private returns to information acquisition and
disseminationdiffer markedly from social returns andasa result the
market equilibrium is not a (constrained) Paretooptimum. Moreover, we
show how firms' actions,e.g. the fraction of shares retained by the
original entrepreneurs, the debt equity ratio, andthelevel of investment,
mayconveyinformation about firmcharacteristics.This in turn affects
the behavior of firms. As a result,the original owners of firms will be
incompletely diversified, firms will not take actions whichmaximize
their stock market value, and, inparticular, they may behave in a risk
averse maimer, paying attention to own risk (whichtraditional theory











Is the stock market just a gambling casino? Are too many
resources being spent on obtaining information by individuals who
are attempting to beat the market? Is it in fact possible to beat
the market?
The answer to these questions is important for an evaluation
of the role of the stock market in our economy. In neoclassical
economic theory, the stock market provides a crucial link between
consumers and producers. In theory, the stock market is supposed
to provide the signals for firms to make the correbt investment
decisions. If, at the extreme, individuals had no "information"
about the relative probabilities of different events and the relative
merits of different investment opportunities, prices would simply
be random, and the stock market would be unable to perform its role
in allocating investment.
There are two contrasting views of information in the stock
market: one that if the market worked well, so prices reflected
values, there would be no incentive to obtain information and
therefore, there cannot exist an i.nformed market equilibrium. Even
if prices did not reflect true values,to the extent that insiders'
gains are at the expense of outsiders, rational outsiders will
*This is a revised version of Part II of a paper presented at
the New Orleans meetings of the Econometric Society, December, 1971.
Since that time, the literature on the subjects discussed here has
grown enormously. I have not attempted to reference all of these more re-
cent contributionS.. I an indebted to N. Rothschild, C. von Weizsacker, R.
Lindsey, V. Krishna, S. Salop, A. Dixitearid A. Weiss for extremely helpful
discussions. Forthcoming in Financial Economics: Essays in Honor of
Paul H. Cootner, edited by Cathryn Cootner and William F. Sharpe,
Prentice-Hall. My interest in the questions discussed here was greatly
stimulated by Paul Cootner, both directly and through his writings.
His influence on my thinking, and my indebtedness to him, should
be apparent.2.
refuse to "play"; and if that happens, the insiders have no one
from whom they can make money.
In contrast, Hirschleifer has argued that in a pure exchange
market, there are strong incentives for information acquisition;
for any individual who finds out information about which state of
nature is about to occur, e.g. which securities are going to rise
in price and which are going to fall, will be able to make a profit
out of the capital gain.
A simple example along the lines of that employed •by Hirschleifer
might be instructive. Let there be two factories. If state 1
occurs factory 1 has an output of Q, factory 2 an output of -IQ;
ifstate 2 occurs, factory 1 has an output of Q, factory 2 an
outputThf 0. Initially, with individuals assuming the two states
equally probable if they choose a portfolio to maximize their expected
utility then the relative price of the two factories will be unity.
If an individual knows that state 1 will occur, he will demand
shares of factory 1 and sell short shares of factory 2 so long as
the relative price of factory 1 shares is less than 2. When it
then becomes publicly known that state 1 will occur, the price
of the shares of firm 1 will rise, those of firm 2 will fall,
and the informed speculator will thus make a large profit.
Indeed, Hirschleifer argues that because the gains from
information acquisition are purely redistributive, any information
acquisition has no social value: some gain at the expense of others.
These two hypotheses appear to be in direct contradiction of one
another: the one suggesting that even when there is a social return to in
vesting in information,. there may be no investment in information, the othe￿3.
suggesting that even when there is no social return to investing in infor-
characterized by partial monopolies, in which particular individuals
2 may have a monopoly of particular pieces of inforrnation
Both views suffer from failure to identify fully the nature of
the social and private gains to information.
It-is clear that central to an understanding of the functioning
of capital market is an analysis of
(a) the incentives, within a market economy,for individuals
to acquire information;
(b) the extent to which market prices reflect the information
of informed individuals; and
(c) the role that market prices play in determining the
behavior of managers of firms.
We argue that within a competitive economy there are only
limited incentives to acquire information which is of general value;
1This aspect of the argument is developed more fully in
subsequent work by Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, l98) and
Grossman (1977).
2This aspect of the argument is developed briefly in
Stiglitz (197 5a)
mation, there will be some investment. We argue that both positions are
wrong--the latter because it implicitly assumes irrationality and/or
noncompetitive behavior, the former because it fails to recognize
the role of the seller of securities in providing information,
because it fails to take account of the presence of "noise" which
results in prices imperfectly conveying information from the
informed to the uninformed,1 and because it fails to note that, even
with free entry into the "information" industry, equilibrium may beindeed, j....onentrakut1imiting,,,.g,se. of a pure exchange econo
the only equilibrium entails zero expenditure
Qu_information (and no trade). In more generalcases, where
individuals differ, there will be some incentives foracquiring
information, but, Jaormation is costly, market prices reflect
t,,,.jn.p.rmatiori of the informed individuals only_imperfect,
do not
Tite fact that market prices/reflect the true value of firmshas
two important consequences:
Owner-managers who know that their firms are undervalued will
diversify imperfectly. Firms which they control will behave ina
risk averse manner, even though their output (profits) havea zero
correlation with the market, and even though the market values
-
themma risk neutral manner. Firms do not, weargue, pursue a
marketvalue maximizing policy but are npt, at the sametime,
subjected to the threat of take-over.
Secondly, good firms may attempt to convey to the market information
about their quality. Since direct statements (such as that their
prospects of returns are very good) have only limited credibility,
indirect screening devices may be employed. Sinceowner-managers
of good firms will be more willing to retain a largerproportion
of their own firms than are owner-managers ofpoor firing, the
fraction of shares owned by insiders ijserveas an effective
screening deviceJ In order to do this, however, owner-managers
of good firms have to retain a larger fraction of theirown shares
kin the more recent literatureon imperfect information, this
is sometimes referred to as an example of a self-selectiondevice;
and the fraction of shares owned is said to serve asa signal.
See Stiglitz (1982), Spence(1973) and Salop and Salop (1976).5.
thanthey otherwise would, so that even in situationswhere the
market prices do accurately reflect thereturns, the firm acts in
a risk averse manner. There are othersituations; however, where
the only equilibrium is one in whichthe market does not differentiate
between ttgood and "bad" firms in orderfor the fraction of shares
retained by the owner-manager not toconvey information about
quality, the poor quality firms have to imitatethe good firms, i.e.
they too have to retain significant fractions oftheir shares.
Other policies, such as thedebt-equity ratio and dividend
policy may also serve as screening devices.We do not pursue the
implications of our analysis for these otherimportant aspects of
financial policy here.1
n..
II.Can There Be an Informed SecuritiesMarket?
In this section, we consider insomewhat more detail the
paradox discussed in the introduction; alternativeresolutions of
the paradox are presented, of whichonly one will be pursued in
subsequent sections of the paper.
We limit Ourselves to apure exchange economy. Individuals are
endowed with ownership claims on different"factories." The output
of the factories is distributed at theend of the period to different
individuals in proportion to theirownership claims at the time.
1See, for instance, Lelandand Pyle (1977), Ross (1977),Stiglitz (198Z and Stiglitz and Weiss (1980,1981)6.
Between the beginning of the period and the end ofthe period there
are, say, T trading periods, during which individualscan trade
their ownership claims with one another.There is little loss of
generality in assuming only two trading periods and itsimplifies
the discussion considerably. In.the intervalsbetween the beginning
of the period and the trading points, individualscan expend resources
to acquire information about the output of thedifferent factories,
or about the probabilities of different states of nature.
We assume everyone has the same tastes and thesame initial
endowments (i.e. their ownership shares in the differentfirms are
identical). Assume that the output in the differentstates of
nature of each of the firms is knowJ but the relativeprObabilities
of the.different states are unknown.Assume, again for simplicity,
that there are only two states of nature.Initially, all individuals
assume the two states equally likely. Consider thefollowing possible
scenarios:
(1) No one does research. Then at the firsttrading date, the
relative price of the different factories willreflect the individual's
priors that the two states of nature areequally likely. Since all
individuals have the same priors, thesame tastes, and the same
endowments, no trade will actually take place. The prices established
on the market at the two trading dates are identical.
(2)One person does research. Could the situation describedabove
be an equilibrium? Hirschleiferargues that it is not. For an
1lndeedconventionally, we define a state of nature as a
complete specification of all the outcomes of the different firms.7.
individual can come along, investsome resources In obtaining informa-
tion about which state of nature willoccur. Assume he obtains the
information before the first tradingpoint. He then knows that the
market value of some firms is too high,some too low. He sells
short the overpriced firms and buys theunderpriced firms with the
proceeds. In the interval between the first andsecond trading
period he makes the information public; this raisesthe price of
the underpriced firms and lowers that of theoverpriced firms,
enabling our investor-in_information to make acapital gain on both
parts of the transaction and to pay for the cost ofresearch.
Thus, the expenditure on information turns out to beprofitable.
Since the amount available forconsurttion is unchanged by the
expenditure on information, Hirschleifer has termed thisexpenditure
on information socially wasteful. Onepersonis made better off,
at the expense of others who are worseoff, and because it requires
resources to obtain information the gains of the formerare smaller
than the losses to the latter.
There are three objections to thisargument:
a)The uninformed individuals in thisargument are particularly
naive. At the minimum, they should discoverthat, were they to have
held on to their original portfolios,they would have done b!tter
thanto have engaged in speculative activity.They should have, in
other words, pursued what I call later, anon-speculative strategy.
Their expected utility from pursuing such astrategy is higher8.
than that from pursuing the naivepolicy assumed by hirschleifer__
and it is equally unsophisticated.
b) It might beargued, on the other hand, that theuninformed
individuals are more sophisticated
than suggested justnow; that
they observe that the market price
Conveys information__when the
price of a security for a particularstate is bid up, it is because
the informed know that thestate is going to occur. Inthis
particular case, the implication ofthis is that again there will
be no trade, but whereas inthe previous case, they refusedto trade,
here they have a demand functionfor securities, but theonly market
clearing price entails no trade.
c) Finally, there isno reason to believe that onlyone -
individualwill do research. Indeed,consider what happens ifonly
two individuals doresearch, and they both come up with thesame
result about which state of nature isto occur before the first
trading period. Assume that they behavecompetitively (rather than
collusively). Then they will bid againsteach other and driveup
the price of the securities whichotherwise would have been under-
valued, and drive down the price of thesecurities which otherwise
would have been overvalued..Thus, when the next trading period
occurs, the prices will be the same asthey were at the first
trading point, and neither individual makesany gains (or losses);
but they are both worse off thanthose who did no research, since
they have invested in resources to obtaininformation.
Thus, Hirschleifer's argument for excessiveexpenditure on
information implicitly requires bothirrationality on the part of
the uninformed and amonopoly on the part of the informed. It is9.
hardly a model of a rational competitive securities rnarket)
This leaves open the question of the possibility of arational,
competitive, informed securities market. We shall argue that
(i) A rational pure exchange market with trades cannot exist if
individuals have identical endowments, tastes, and information.
(ii) Moreover, if the level of information is endogenous,
a rational, jformed market cannot exist.
XIX. Pure Gambling Markets
There are two central properties of what we shall refer toas
aure gambling markets. (i) The gains of one individual are completely
at the expense of some other individual, i.e. it is apure exchange
market and (ii) the outcomes (events on which the bet is placed)
are uncorrelated with all participantsother sources of income.
The latter condition is what distinguishes qambljg markets from
inaarance markets. The reason that trade (gambling) occurs is that
individuals have different opinions about the probability distribution
of the outcomes. The prototype of a pure gambling market is a horse
race. One of the questions to which we shall turn later is whether
the stock market ought to be viewed as a pure gambling market.
There is a widespread view that rational individuals who are
risk averse should not (or would not) gamble. This, it isbelieved,
would be true even if individuals could acquire information about
11t is not an answer to this tosuggest that it is unlikely that
two individuals will come up with exactly the same information at
exactly the same moment. For if one individual comes up always
first, then he is in effect a monopolist in information and the
market is not competitive; if different individuals up with the
information first in different periods, then the individual is a
temporary monopolist- -the market is still not competitive in the
conventional sense. In either case, for Hirschleifer to be correct
requires that the uninformed also be irrational, in the sense to
be defined below.10.
the various events. The fact that some information about the
relative merits of different horses can be acquired does not make
it any more rational to gamble on horses. Equilibrium ina pure
gambling market with rational risk averse individuals thus entails
no trades (no gambling) and no information. These contentions, if
true, clearly have profound implications for understanding the
nature of the stock market, j the stock market can be described
as a pure gambling market.
In this section, we examine the nature of equilibrium inpure
gambling markets with rational, risk averse, individuals. Critical
to the analysis is an understanding of the concept of tionality.
The central question is, what is reasonable for the individual
to know? What does he observe, and how does he make inferenceson
the basis of these observations?
Our concern here is with repeated markets, like horse races.
The reason that there is a widespread presumption that betting on
horse races is irrational is that there is enough experience with
gambling in such markets that rational "individuals should have
learned that they can't win." (This is not a completely persuasive
argument, because some individuals do win, and it is this observation
which keeps others in the market.) The
intuitive belief that gambling is irrational is, however,
I think, correct. Our objective is to clarify the precise sense
in which this is so.
In the subsequent discussion we shall explore several alternative
notions of rationality. We begin our analysis with a concept we
refer to as weak rationality. We shall say that an individual's11.
xectatione weakly rational if the expected value of his
aains are equal to his averaga ins.
Note that rationality in this sense is much weaker than that
which usually goes under the rubric "rational expectations" where
it is the expectations on the whole distribution of returnsthat
conform to ex post realizations.
We now show:
Proposition 1. _jJindividualshave weakly rational expectations.
and are risk averse, there will be no trading in a pure garling
market.
Proof. For simplicity, assume individuals' income apart from the
gamble is given. Let the gamble be definedas, follows: if a particular
even Eeoccurs, the individual receives 1; if it does notoccur, he
pays p/l-p. The amount he bets is chosen to
(5.1)max u(Y+B )11J +u(yJ-






(3.3)BJ >0 as 11.>_LL
C 1-p
The expected gain is
(3.14) 1s[u- (l—n)]I.
Thus if betting occurs (1B1> o),
some individuals must have expectations of gains which are not
realized.
g.e.d.12.
On the other hand, the following converse of Proposition 1
can also be easily established:
Proposition 2: If there are someindividualswho do not display
rationality, and some who do. then equilibrium in a pure betting:
mcdl entails some_gamj,jg:.
Proof.We established earlier that
()BOas
i-iP<






Hence, for at least two individuals, jandk
(.8) n




Inthis discussion so far, we have said nothing either about the
consequences of differential information or about the incentives to
acquire information. It seems plausible that in most interesting
situations (including the stock market) individuals have (or can13.
obtain) information, that different individualsobtain different
information, and these differences are what makesuch markets
function. We shall show that even whenindividuals have different
information, provided they are rational ina particular sense to
be explained below, there will beno trade in a pure gambling market.
First, however, we examine a somewhat differentnotion of
rationality, in which there will be trades inthe.pure gambling
market. We shall say that the market exhibitsgrouprational1
if the average value of individuals'estimates of the probability
of the states is equal to the trueprobability. Assume, for instance,
that individuals are betting on theproportion of red balls in a very
large urn containing red and black balls. Each individualis
allowé3 to draw 100 balls from theurn. The proportion of red
balls in their sample provides an unbiasedstatistic on the proportion
of red balls in the urn. Thus theverage value of individuals'
estimates of the probability of red balls isequal to the true
probability. If individuals bet on the basis of theirestimate,
and if the distribution of estimates issymmetric we can show
Proposition 3:Themarket odds provide an estimate oftheprobabilities
j2.ch are biased towards .forevents with probability near .5
gr for concentrated distributio. More generally, marketodds
will not equal the true probability, even with a large
population.
Proof:
Let11*denote the true probability. Consider thedemand
and supply of bets of individualswho over and underestimate it by
an amount x. By the assumption of a symmetricdistribution, the"-
numberof such individuals is the same. Assumep =11* .Consider
first the case of 11* =1/2.It is clear that E(-x) =-8(x)
where 8(x) is the demand for bets of aperson whose estimate of II







Wenow show that if 11* > ,8(x)<-B(-x), x > 0
(Y+B)(p+x)/U'(Y-B)[p-x)
/d 2j2p-1) (3.u) din _______ =
2
x2)((12 2 --p)-x) U'(Y-(1-p-x) Ut(Y+)(i_p+x)
-,e
+ B _________ i-p
I + i.
(1-p) u'(y-—) ut(y+EQ._) 1—p 1-p
At 11* = this is negative for all B >0.Hencefor 11*
U'(Y-B)(p-x) sufficiently near -,atp =11*,when
U'(Y+)(1-p+x) i—p
c hence 8(x) < -B(--x). Thus, for
UI(Y_2)(1_p_x)i-p
JB(x)dXQ,p <11*
Simiiarly,for x =0,B =0;hence the R.H.Sof (3.11) also equals zero.
Taking the derivative with respect to x, we obtain at x =0(since
.d8= = i/2nç1—rr)A(y)where A ='tU!/U') ai—15.
2(2p-l)- i——---<0 ,for0< p￿ 1 ,
p(1-p) p(i-p)3
so again B(x) C -B(-x).
For II*_..jlarge and x large, the market odds may provide
either an under or overestirliatej
Of course, in any market in which the market odds differ from
the true probability there is an incentive to obtain accurate
information concerning the true probability, provided such information
is not too expensive.
Still, in the situation just described, with the market displaying
aransionalitv, it seems foolish for individuals not to realize
that others are betting on the basis of their sample information;
their iétting behavior ought to convey information, and the rational
individual ought to take this into account in forming his
expectations.
We shall say that an individual is rational if the expected
return, conditional on whatever is observable to the individual,
is equal to the average realized return on an (arbitrarily) large
number of repetitions of the gamble. This concept differs from our
earlier notion of wsak rationality in that we require the individual
to form his expectations conditional on whatever is observable;
1Iet u'(y) =e.LetII=3/Il.,x =1/8. Then for
x =, ifp/a -p)=3,from (3.2),
(exp.-). 7=3 or B=ln-
while for x =1/8,expfEi- .=3 or Is!=in Cin I
Hencep > 3..16.
but like the concept of weak rationality, it entails a far less
stringent notion of rationality than that associated with conventional
rational expectations, since it requires only that the mean of the
distribution coincide with the mean of the true distribution.Because,
in general, different individuals may observe different signals,
they will have different information and therefore different beliefs.
One might have thought that therefore, in this situation, there
could be trade on a gambling market. We shall now show that this
is not the case.
Proposition 1..If all indj.iduals have rational expectations.
there can be no trade in a pure gambling market.
Proof. For simplicity, let us assume that we have two groups in
the population, one of which only observes the market odds of the
gamble-, the other of which observes something else, which is correlated
with the event on which the gamble is being made. The former
group we shall refer to as the uninformed, the latter as the
informed. Since the uninformed observe only the market odds, if
they trade it must be the case that (using (3.2))
E(ff'ip) p
where the superscript u indicates that it is the uninformed
individuals' expectations.
The informed individuals form their expectations on some signal
£2
,andpossibly on p too. Clearly, their expected utility, if they
ignore the information £2, must be less than or equal to their
expected utility if they do not ignore their information17.
maxE(U'IQ,p)>waxE(U'Ip) (3.13)
(B) (B)
AssumeB*(7,p) is the optimum trade function of the informed and
IB*(&,pb>Oforsome
But if, say,
E(I1'Ip) >pand BU > 0 , (3.JA)
lear1yB1 C 0,andthe expected return to gambling, for that
is negative. Moreover, by hypothesis, both the signal and the
-
eventare unconelatedwiththe individuals'inccme. Hence, the gamble
represents a mean reducing increase in the spread of the distribution




Theresult can easily be generalized to more than two groups.
The basic intuition is simple: gambling cannot increase the mean
income of all.groups; at least one group must have a lower mean
income. At the same time, gambling increases the dispersion of
the distribution of income. Hence, there must be at least one group
for whom expected utility is lowered as a result of gambling. Hence,
there cannot exist a gambling market with all rational individuals.
The argument we have just presented can also be easily generalized to
cases where Y is not constant and endowments are not identical.
The critical property of a pure gambling market is that itservesno17a.
insurance function, i.e., if the bet isabout the event S,
-EU'JfyJij — . . ,allj,j 3. EtJ'1[Y'p's]
(where -S denote all the states inwhich S does not occur).
With perfect information, a marketon the gamble on S would have
no trade. (The initial resourceallocation, relative to the event 5,







This asserts that if everybody had theinformation, no further trade
will occur.
-
Assumenowonlya subset of individuals have the information.
Our "no gambling market" theoremasserts that there still can be no




whereII(p,S) is the probability of Soccurring conditional on
observing the market odds p
pcan only depend on .Assumep does not depend on
Then B must be independent of
The informed individual willonly "sell" bets if
__EU'J[yJISlnLp.s) < ..a.. (3.19)
EUTJEYJI_s](l_n(p,s))
which, using (3.16) and (3.18 ),isclearly impossible.
Assume p does depend on .Thenforthe informed to be willing
to sell bets17b.
—<—s—, (3.20) EU'J[YJj...S,p,7](1.u(p,sf2))
foreach ,andthe given p . Sincep is a function of
iy'JfYJIsj2luc&2,s) < (3.21) EU'3 {yJ J(1_u(12,s))
Thismust be true for all £ for. which
(Q) =p (3.22)
But for each ,forwhich (3.22) is true, (5.17) holds.
Hence,
EUT1[Y'IS,f2Ju(7,s)crEUhi[Yij_S,7)J(l-rr,s)).
Takingexpectations over all for which (3.22) holds, we obtain
EUt.[Yils,p]ucp,s)c1P_EuIiryil_Sp J(1-rr(p,s))
which contradicts (5.18).
The intuition behind this resultmay be put another way: Any
individual who is uninformed, and
knows that he is uninformed, willnot bet, since he knows that his
opponent will only bet when the odds are in hisfavor. Asswue that
theindividual does not know whether he ismore or less informed
than his rival, but believes that his rivalknows whether he is18.
more or less informed. The rival
will only bet when he isthe more
informed and the odds are inhis favor. Since theindividual knows
this, he will not be willing toengage in the bet. Thus, theonly
possible case in which bettingcan occur is when both bettorsdo
not know whether they are themore or less informed. it isas likely
that the individual is the lessinformed as that he is themore
informed. But then betting simplyrepresents a mean
preserving spread in their incomes,and if both are riskaverse (no
matter what their utilityfunctions look like), neitherwill be
i..2 willing to engage in a bet.
IV. Incentives to AcquireInformation in a Pure ExchangeMarket
Proposition )-i-hasone important corollary. Sincein a pure
gambling marketjith rationalexpectations, there will never exist
trades regardless of informationaldifferences there Wi].].never
be an incentive toacquire information
If we observe anexchange market in which there istrade,
either we can infer thatsome participants in themarket are not
rational or that the market isnot a pure gambling market -Trade
may be desirable if individuarsmarginal rates of substitution
across states of nature differ inthe absence of trade.Insurance
markets clearly serve thisfunction. Although sometrading in the
stock market clearly servesthis function, it isquestion.apj.e
whether this provides aprimary motivation for most of thetrading
which occurs.
-
Inan exchange market withtrade, the question again arises,whether
therewillbe an incentive to acquireinformation Sincethere is trade,
thereis am argument that bybeccaing bett informed about- thetrue
probabilities, say of the two alternativestates, expected utility
1Recent workby Milgrom and Stokey (1979) hasgeneralized this reult using AumannTs concept of commonknowledge,(1976)
2For thedefinition and interpretationof a "mean preservingspread" ina disFrjhijj-jnn spp Pnfhqrhj1_fjfl.7(]Q719.
would be increased (for sufficiently small costs ofacquiring
information) .Butthat argument is not necessarily correct,for it
is possible that if some individuals wereinformed, then the market
price would convey all the information; but if the marketprice
conveyed all the information, it would not pay any individual to
pay to become informed.
ggetitive equilibrium with costly information inwhich prices
aiz_n.flect_the information.
-
Asimple example may make this clearerJ
Assume we had an insurance market for rain.Whether it rains
or not depends on certain factors whichcan be observed at a cost;
some of the factors are observed, some arenot, so that from the-
obser€d factors, one cannot predictprecisely whether it will or
will nt rain. Let'1 represent the information, and letit
be the estimate of the probability of rainwhen the information is I
II =f('l)
For simplicity we assume f' > 0
We assume that everyone who observes theweather observes exactly
the same information (later, we shallconsider the case where
different individuals obtain differentinformation)'.
The net demand for "bets" on the weather(insurance for the
event rain) will be a function of the individual'sestimate of the
1This kind ofexample has subsequently been developed at
greater length in a series of papers by Grossman(l977)and
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, l980a).20.
probability (and of the "price" of the bet, i.e. themarket odds).
Let p represent the price. Then
B =B1(p,Ir)
whereB is the (per capita) demandby informed individuals.
eco,
Anincrease in the price lowers the demandbut an increase in the
estimated probability of the event increasesthe demand.
The uninformed (those who do not observe '1).mustbase their
betting on a priori information (which weassume is given, and unaltered
throughout the analysis) and on market price (odds);for the
individual knows that if there areinformed individuals, the
markeCodds will reflect their information. Ifwe write
•Bu= Bu(p), with B/p <
torepresent his demand function, then market clearingrequires
B1(p,Tt-)+ Bu(P) =0
Under our assumptions,forevery value 11there is a unique value
of p
p =p(n)p' >0
i.e. the uninformed can infer precisely fromthe market odds the
information of the informed (eventhough the market odds need not
equal ii).But then there is no incentive foranyone to obtain
information. /
Notethat if no one obtains information, the marketodds
will be invariant period toperiod and cannot reflect any information.
It would pay then. someone to obtain the information if the21.
information were not too costly.
Thus, there is no non-stochastic competitiveequilibrium to
the exchange model with information which iscostly (but not too
cdstly). If the demand functions for betsdepend on some other
set of variables which werestochastic, and not observable (and the
values of which were not inferableindirectly, say, by observing
some other set of markets),then the marketprice (odds) will depend
on this variable as well, and the uninformed willnot be able to
from the market odds. Thus, inexchange
gambling markets there may exist market
which prices do not always perfectly
the informed, although they do onaverage.
in this system for the uninformed tostudy
functions of the informed and uninformed,
for by knowing the demand function
can infer the information about ,and
indeed the only) way for the uninformed
to obtain the information which we have assumed isavailable to the
informed.
V. The Stpck Market as a Gambling Market
The stock market is clearly not apure gambling market. Yet,
the arguments of the preceding sectionsuggest both that much of
the trading on the securities markets is basedon some kind of
irrationality, and that there are only limited incentives to
acquire information about the returns of various securities.In
infer precisely the value
markets which are not pure
equilibrium with trade in
reflect the information of
There is an incentive
the demand
rather than 1 directly;
and the market price they
this may be a cheaper (or-22.
this section, we attempt to showthis.
For simplicity, we assume that allindividuals have a constant
wage income, are endowed initially withan equal fraction of the
shares of each of the firms, andare risk averse. Initially,we
shall assume that they have thesame degree of risk aversion. Let
us define a non-speculator as an individualwho purchases (holds)
a representative market share,paying no attention to price; we
define a culator as an individualwho attemptà to form
expectations of the returns of varioussecurities and allocates his
portfolio to maximize his expectedutility, given those expectations
and market prices.
Individuals may form expectations aboutall securities or only -'a.
abouta subset of securities.
.th. . .th The expectations of thejindividualwith respect to the i
securityare said to be nbiased if (where tildesdenote the true
values, carets the estimated values),
=. ELI.= 1 1'1k
where is the jth individualsexpectations about the mean of
the ith security and is his expectations of its covariance
with the returns of the kthsecurity.
If individuals have a choice betweenobtaining unbiased
information at a cost or following thenon-speculation strategy,
all individualswill follow the non-speculationstrategy.
Assume only one individualspeculated. Clearly, if all others
are pursuing a non-speculativestrategy, he must end up with his
representative market share of each of thefirms, and hence his23.
income pattern is thesame, but he has spent resources to obtain
the information, and so is worse off. Ifseveral individuals
speculate, and they obtain identical information theargument is the
same. If they obtain different (but onaverage unbiased) information
on average they must obtain the marketreturn, but sometimes they
do better than the market, sometimesworse. If the "quality of
the information" is uncorrelated with theoutput of the economy
(so that the individual does notconsistently do better than the
market average when the market doespoorly, and conversely)
the variance of his income is larger thanwith the non-speculative
strategy and, as we argued above, his net mean income islower:
again it does not pay to speculate.
-
Theresult we have obtained is valid even ifsome individuals
have a comparative advantage in obtaininginformation. If, for
instance, one individual could find outcostlessly f or certain
the returns to different securities, otherswould be unwilling to
trade with him,tie would simply determine the prices of the
different securities. If two individuals believedthat they have
a comparative advantage--and they agreed on thereturns (for
certain) of the different securities--again therewould be
negative net returns to acguiring information, since infact they
would end up with exactly the same portfolio thatthey would have
had had they followed the alternativenon-speculation strategy.
The result can also be extended to cases whereindividuals have
different utility functions.24..
Assume all individuals evaluate alternativestrategies in terms
of the mean and variance of incomewhich they generate. Assumethey have
choice between (a) obtaining unbiasedinformation about individual secur—
ities, (b)followjng thenon-specuiaistrategy, or (c) following the
non-speculation strategy with respect to the riskyassets, but
obtaining information about the mean and variance of therisky
securities together, at a lower cost thanobtaining information
about individual securities. We now showthey will follow one of
the latter two strategies.
All iindividualswho obtain each period unbiased sure
information would purchase the same bundleof risky securities, i.e.
the market bundle. An individual whopurchased only information
about the mean and variance of the marketbundle would, however,
have just as good a knowledge of the "market line"1as the
individual who knew the returns to individualsecurities. But he
would have paid less for information, so he wouldbe better off.
11n theterminology of mean variance analysis, the "market




and are the mean and standard deviation of the
income from a portfolioconsisting of all the risky securities
on the market, and r is the (safe) rateof interest.24a.
Thus, in a mean variance model, individuals would never
acquire information about the properties of individual
securities 1,2
Note that screening information (discussed below in
Section VII), that some,stock is above average, some other
stock below average, does not, in general, affect individual's
beliefs about the return of the market as a whole. Much




In subsequent work, S. Grossman has formalized and considerably
extended these arguments. Grossman (1977).
2This result can be seen as an immediate corollary of
Proposition 4. In a mean variance model, information which
leaves unchanged expectations about the mean and variance
of the market portfolio leaves unchanged individual's port-
folio allocations. Thus (3.16) and (3.17) are satisfied.25.
Vi.LQoAlternative Explanations of Trade andInformation
Acquisition on the Stock Market
Trades do occur on the stockmarket, and there is considerable
expendjtute on information about particularsecuritj•,. How do
we recencile these observations with theresults of the preceding
two sections. There are two basicexplanations for trading:
not all individuals are rational, in thesense in which we have
defined the term, and individuals'endowments differ so that trade
is desirable, even with identicalinformation (and, perhaps more
to the point, their endowments ofassets, including non-traded
assets, change in such a way as to warrant continuoustrade in
the stock market): We discuss thesealternative explanations in
the next two subsections.
VI.l Irrationality
In this section we shall see thatas long as individuals are
finitely lived, and there is a continual streamof new individuals
being born (entering maturity) itmay be optimal for there to be
speculation (from the private point of view). Theargument
requires not only that a fool be bornevery moment but that each
of us believes he is not that foolj
An individual entering the market observesa distribution of
returns from speculating. If he assumed hewere simply average,
he would not speculate. But if he believesthat the reason that
1Thiscorresponds to the observation of most teachers that
more than 1/2 of their students believe thatthey are in the upper half of their class.26.
individuals who have done aboveaverage is that they have a comparative
advantage in obtaining information (andare not just "lucky"--
alternative hypotheses between whichthe data may not discriminate)
and he believes that he is one ofthose individuals, he willgo
ahead and speculate. If thereare many such individuals, there will
be a "competitive" market forsecurities. As some individuals
"win"theirestimate of their comparativeadvantage may actually
increase; as other individuals "lose" theirestimate decreases, and
if they lose long enoughthey stop being speculators and adopt
the alternative non-speculativestrategy.
The "thinness" of the market willdepend then on the flow of
new entrants into the market, thespeed with which individuals revise
theirxpectations and the variance of thereturns. If they are
stubbdn,andrevise their expectationsonly slowly (the gambler
whose luck is about to turn), thenonly if individuals have a long
string of bad luck will they drop out of themarket.
IV. .2 Differences inendowments and tastes
Some trading on the stock market is lifecycle trading: young
individuals purchasing securitieth whichthey will sell when they
are old. But if our earlier analysis iscorrect, rational
individuals would simply purchasea mutual fund; there would not
be trading in individual securities.
When entrepreneurs are lucky, and thefirms which they have
started do particularly well, they will havea disproportionate share
of their wealth in their ownfirm.If they are riskaverse, they
will thus wish to trade theirownfinnfor a mutual fund consisting27.
of the market as a whole. This gives riseto some trade; but again,
if the analysis of thepreceding sections is correct, it cannot
give rise to sustained trading. Onceportfolios are "balanced"
so that each individual has a proportionateshare in all firms,
there will be no further trading.
Not all assets are tradeable; inparticular, markets for
human capital are notoriously imperfect.To the extent that (a) the
huthaxicapitalof different individuaj.b yieldreturns which are ilzperfectly
correlated; and (b) different securitieson the market have different cor-
relations with the reFnrns to differentindlviduam' humancapital, if
individuals initially
had identical endowments ofsecurities, there would be an incentive
for them to trade, to obtainportfolios that are appropriately
matched to their human capital.Moreover, changes in their human
capital will, in general, give rise tochanges in the optimal
portfolios. Thus coal miners are likely to sellcoal short in their
portfolio.. (assuming the skills of beinga coal miner are specific
to the industry).. I suspect this kindof "insurance" or "matching"
function of trading in securities isrelatively unimportant. In
any case, if this is the primary motivation, it hasinteresting
and important implications for the natureof the incentives for
information acquisition, which we shall discussin the next section.27a.
The assumption that individuals evaluateportfolios simply
in terms of their means and varianceswas critical to the
result that only information about the marketportfolio had
value. (Information about the mean and variance ofthe market
portfolio has social value, when individuals' attitudes
towards risk differ, since it allows a more efficientdistri-
bution of the burden of risk; formally, for suchinfomration,
assumption (3.16) is not valid.) When individuals' attitudes
towards risk are not described by means and variances(or by
one of the other utility functions for which ageneralized
mutual fund theorem (Cass—stiglitz, 1970) isvalid), then,
again, information about a particular securitymay have value.
(Again, assumption (3.16) is not valid.)
vrsut note that if the returns to all securitiescan be




where = = 0,and where there are enough securities
so that individuals can diversify out of the idiosyncratic
risk (ci) (as is commonly asserted), thenagain, information
about individual securities is again ofno value. Individuals'
expected utility will be a function of the implicit prices
associated with each of the market factors (assumedto be
unaffected by information about a small firm) and theprobability
distribution of these market factors. This willdetermine their
demand for each of the market factors. Thusex post realized
utility level will be a function only of the realization of
the vector M and the implicit market pricesassociated with
each of the market factors (and, ofcourse, the subject27b.
probability distribution of these market factors). Again,
if assumption (3.16) is valid, (3.16) willbe; infonnatjon
about particular securities will notgenerate any trades
and such information will have no value.
VII. The Returns to Information
In this section, we shall examine inmore detail the nature of
the incentives for informationacquisition in the stock market.
We shall show that there are markeddiscrepancies between the
social and private returns to information.28.
VII.l The taxonomy of information and the capital market
First, however, we must distinguish among several different
kinds of information.
In another paper, on information in the labormarket, (Stiglitz
1975) I distinguished between two kinds of information:general
and specific. The former was information about a characteristic
of an individual which affected his productivity in avariety of
jobs, the latter was information relevant for a specific jnh.
Here we need to distinguish four kinds of information,depending
on how the information relates to both buyers and sellers.
(1) General-general: information which affects all securities
and all purchasers, for instance, that pertaining to the relative
probabi4ity of different states of nature which are of importance
to all -individuals (e.g. the probability of a recession).
(2) General-specific: information which is of importance to
specific individuals, but which affects their attitudes towards
a whole class of securities, e.g. the probability of a recession
in the coal mining industry is of importance for workers in that
industry, but if the decline of the coal mining industry is
uncorrelated with, say, the business cycle, it may be of relatively
little importance to individuals who work in other industries.
(3) Specific-general: information which is specific to a firm
(e.g. the mental stability of the manager) but which is of
interest to all individuals who ownthesecurity.29.
(U) Specific-specific: information which is ofvalue both to a
specific individual (or class of individuals) and toa specific firm.
If I am risk neutral, the only information I want isthe mean return
of the curity; if I am riskaverse, I will want information about
other risk properties of the security.
Most information obviously falls inscope between the very
general and the very specific: it affects not all firms butmore
than one; it is of value not to all individuals but tomore than
one. The dichotomy is. important, however, both because themechanisms
for obtaining the returns to information and therelationship
between social and private returns differ in the differentcategories.
There is another important distinction which must bemade:
some &fbrmation may be of "value" to different individuals, but
the information may increase the value of thesecurity in the eyes
of some, decrease it in the eyes of others.
Information that the firm will do very well if a certain
contingency arises, but will do very badly Otherwise,may raise the
valuation of the security in the eyes of those who think theevent
likely, lower it in the eyes of those who think the event unlikely.1
For instance, an individual who v'orks in coalmining and whose wage
is, as a consequence, correlated with the prosperity of the coal
industry, will value firms whose profits are negatively correlated
with the prosperity of the coal industry morehighly than those
LObviously, if there is acomplete set of Arrow Debreu securities
markets, then the judgments concerning the relative probabilities
of different events affects the relative prices of different
contingent commodities, but given the prices of Arrow Debreu
securities, the firm need not concern itself with the probability
of different events (see Stiglitz.(].97o), Grossman-Stiglitz(1977, l980b)).30.
whose profits are positively correlated; forsomeone in another
industry, a negative correlation with the coal industrymay correspond
to a positive correlation with his ownwage, and thus he will find
such a security unattractive.
Consider a bit of information which affects two securitieswhich
are initially indistinguishable. If, as a result of theinformation,
all individuals now agree that security A is more valuablethan
security B, then we call that information hjerarchical; that is to
say, at least with respect to the characteristic being identified,
all individuals agree that, say, more of the characteristic isbetter
than less. For instance, information related only to themean of
the securities is hierarchical. On the otherhand, when one subset
of the-,-population values A more highly as a result of theinformation,
while another values B more highly, then wesay that the information
is I.ching, i.e. it matchesspecific indi'uiduals to
specific securities)
vII.2 Social return to informationin an exchange economy
From this discussion, we can see the nature of the socialreturns
in a pure exchange economy:2
to information/ given that individuals are different, it is in
general not optimal for individuals to have the same portfolio.
Information (both general and specific) allows a better"matching"
of securities with individuals.
1This distinctionplayed an important part in my analysis of
information in labor markets. Information about thewage a
specific firm pays is hierarchical information about certain
non-pecuniary characteristics of die firm is 1i3ely to be "matching"
information. See Stiglitz (l97)..
production, there are, of course, further returns.
See below.31.
VII.3 Private returns to information
What is the private return to providing information?
The private return to providing information takes two forms:
(a) a direct consumption effect, particularly ofspecific-specific
information, allowing the individual who acquires the information
to obtain a portfolio better suited to his needs; (b)a market
valuation effect; if announcement of the information results ina
change in the market value of the securities, then by buying the
security if it is underpriced or selling the security short if it
is overpriced, before releasing the information, and thenmaking
the information public, the individual is able toreap a capital gain.
In this sub-section, we are concerned primarily with the
latte.r effect, particularly with the incentives for individuals
to obtain, and disseminate, hierarchical information.1 For
individualsto be able to appropriate the returns from this kind
of information
(i)theymust own, or be able to acquire, the asset before the
informationis disseminated;
(ii) there must be an incentive for someone to disseminate the
information, so that the market price can adjust to reflect the
information;and
(iii)the information, when disseminated, must be believed; it
must be credible.
1H.ierarchicalinformation, it will be recalled, is information
which affects all individuals' evaluation of the asset identically;
it does not result in any better allocation of the assetamong
the population.31a.
There are problems at each of the threestages of the analysis.
Our previous discussion (sections II and Iv)argued that in a pure
betting market there would be no trade. The fact thatone individual
(who is believed to be informed) iswilling to buy some shares from
me conveys the information that he believes the sharesare under-
priced; I will not, as a result, be willing to sell tohim.
This has one interesting implication: it issometimes
suggested that firms that are undervalued will besubjected to take
over bids. If all takeover bids were so motivated thenthey would
never be successful (if those making the takeover bidson average
were correct in identifying undervalued firms)
Information dissemination poses a standardpublic good (free
rideT) problem: all individuals who own shares inthe finn would
like someone else to pay the costs of informationdissemination.
All who own shares in the firm gain from the increasein the price.2
1Theremay, of course, be other motivations for take-overs;
a wealthy individual might, for instance, wish tobuy an asset which
is negatively correlated with the return to hisother assets. As
we argued earlier, trade can occur to match assets with
individuals, but it seems that this provides little of the motivationfor most take -overs.
similar free rider problem arises in take-overs aimedat
improving the quality of the management. If onaverage, those who
engage in takeovers do improve the quality of management, so that
the returns on the asset are increased, it willresult in an increase
in the value. But then no small shareholder hasan incentive to sell
his shares to the firm attempting the take-over.He shares in the gains
from the improved management. The only situation inwhich there is an
incentive for a take—over to occur is when thenew management can
appropriate some of the increase in returns for itself. Thispoint has been developed by Grossman andHart.(l98o32.
Only if a single individual owns all the shares, or if the
owners act collusively, can the full benefits of thechange in
price from the information transmission be capturedby the provider
of the information.1
c-r
1Notethat if there is a cost oftransmitting the information, and these costs are large, and area function of the number of
individuals to whom the information istransmitted, the only individuals to whom it pays to transmitinformation are other
potentially large shareholders (the wealthy). Thus the aresuppliedQrmatjother wealthy sellers of securities.33.
There is, however, a natural methodby which the owners of the
firm can act collusively: to have theinformation provided by the
firm itself. Assume that the ownersof the firm have perfect
knowledge about the returns to their firm (and henceare in agreement).
Then clearly, provided the transmissioncosts are not too high, it
will pay the firm to make the informationpublic.
It would of course pay firms with lowreturns not to have
information disclosed. But if some firms discloseinformation, and
others do not, the market will assume that thefirms which have
not disclosed information must have a lowreturn. Since there is
"no information" aboutany of these firms, they will all be treated
identically. But firms who are above theaverage of this "below
average group" can increase their value by disclosinginformation,
or having information disclosed about them (at theexpense of
course of those below average in the belowaverage group). The
process repeats itself until information about all the firms is
revealed.
The process is closely parallel to that which Ihave used else-
where to describe the education system asa screening device. It
is in the self-interest of the bright tobecome so identified, and
although this identification need have no returns (if it
does not result in a change in production), it willyield private
returns to the bright at the expense of thestupid.
There are, however, some important differences whichmake the
analysis of screening in the capital market considerablymore
complex than in the education market. The most importantdifferences
arise from the fact that human capital is (atleast currently) notnormally bought or sold short; that is, even if I know thatyou are
overvalued, I cannot sign a contract to sellyour services next
period, announce the true value of your prcductivity, andthen,
next period having arrived, buyyour services from you at the now
much lower price. Nor can I buy a fraction ofyour human capital
for later resaleJ Thus, in our discussions ofscreening of
individuals, we assumed that it was the individual who made the
decision about whether to have himself screened. Sincein the
capital market, through speculation, every individual isa potential
owner of every firm, there is the possibility, atleast, that it
might be in the interests of someone other than theoriginal owner
to certify the characteristics of the firm. Ouranalysis has
suggested that so long as the screening industry iscompetitive, the
returns to screening will be captured by the originalowners of
the security, and thus it is they who--as in theeducation market--
have the incentive to provide the screening.
In the education market, it is natural to assume(although not
necessarily the case) that individuals know more about theirown
ability than anyone else. Similarly, in the context of thecapital
market it is natural to assume that the individuals who dohave
more information about the security are the originalowners of
the firm.2
LThese statementsare not quite correct. There are firms which
attempt to find "undervalued" individuals, screen them, and then sell
their labor services at a higher price, and some individualsdo
incorporate themselves, in effect selling a portion of their human
capital. But these instances are more the exception than the rule.
2i is, ofcourse, possible that others have more information
about the prospects of the firm than the originalowners. In that
case these individuals may take over the firm, and have the firm
provide the information. But if the original owners know that this
is the motive for the takeover, they will be unwilling to sell.35. VIX.4 Relationship between the social andprivate returns to information
In the previous.subsection, we showedhowcertainaspects ofthe problem of informationon the capital market can berecast
asproblemsin the-economics ofscreening. Wefcan thus borrow some
results from the general theory ofscreening. We obtain the
following two important conclusions:
(a) The returns to the provision ofinformation which changes the
market value of firms is captured primarilybythe original owners
of the sharesitis accordingly they who havean economic incentive
toprovide the information.
(b) The private returns tothe provision ofinformationdo not, in
aenera1correnJto thsociaet justas in the case of
screening of individuals. There is likely to be excessivespending
on "hierarchical screening," i.e. inscreening for characteristics
whicfftindiviauals value in the sameway, and too little spending
on "matching screening", i.e. on screening forcharacteristics
which individuals value in differentways. The latter can be seen
mosteasily by considering a case where the provision ofinformation
leaves the price ofthe asset unchanged, the increase in thedemand
byone group being offset, say, by a decrease in thedemand by
another group. Even when there isessentially no cost to providing
this information, and even though theremay be a highsocial return
to doing so, there will be no incentive forthe firm to provide
thisinformation.
In the next two sub-sections, we provideboth examples showing
the relationship between social andprivate returns for hierarchical
and matching information.36.
The third problem we noted above is thatof credibility:
although firms have an economic incentive toprovide
iaformatioat.hey_also have an economic incentive to provide
tnLainjorination, just as in the education market individuals have
an incentive to have themselves overrated. In the education
market, an individual who has misrepresented himself is usually
found out, and thus is not able to enjoy the benefits of his
misrepresentation (a higher wage) for long. in the capital market
it may be more difficult to ascertain misrepresentation,and by the
time it is ascertained, the original owner of thesecurity has
already absconded with his gains. This makes it even morenecessary
than in the case of the education market for the information tobe
certified by "public" outside institutions. These institutions
in thircapital market are the investmentconsultants, the stock
brokeiage firms, etcJ
1The division between directproduction of information and
certification depends, presumably, on comparative costs ofproducing
different kinds of information and the fact that some information
may be relevant to several different firms. That is, GM may have
an advantage in producing information about the production
characteristics of GM, but a stock brokerage firm will produce
information about the demand for cars ingeneral.57.
VII.5 An Example of HierarchicalScreening
We assume that everyone is riskaverse and evaluates the
portfolio in terms of the mean and standard deviationof the return.
We assume, moreover, that there areenough securities of each type so
that the individual, -ifhe completely diversifies, facesessentially no
risk There are two kinds ofsecurities, type 1 with mean 9
and type 2 with mean 2l > 2 All securities are known to
have the same variance,02. There areequal• .!ners of the two types
of securities. For simplicity, we assume allsecurities are
independently distributed, and the distribution of returnsof each
is normal. All individuals have thesame utility function, which
-crY we assume is of the form -e where y is income. (constant
absolute risk aversion). Hence, the individualseeks to maximize a2
(7.l)- --t
whereY is his mean income
4isthe variance of his income.
Each individual is endowed initially with one firm. He knows
what kind of firm it is, but does not know whattype any other firm
is. He can supply to the market information about thequality of
his firm.
The cost of providing this information isC;we
assume c is neither very small norvery large.1
0-0 — 0-0 (7.2) (1 - >c> (eio)(l-1
2
2ai,. 2Qay
1The role of theseinequalities will be apparent shortly.37a.
There are then two equilibria:
(a) The no-information equilibriuni. The relative price of all
securities is unity. The individuals who owntypeone
firms retain a fraction A of the wealth in their own security
and divide the remainder equally among all other shares. A is
chosen to38.
(7.) max © + -
2
when 0 is the mean return on all securities soldon themarket.
For the moment, we shall assune that theowners of low productivity
firms retain the same fraction of their sharesas do the owners of
high productivity firms.1 This implies that theaverage return to
0 +0
a randomly selected share on the market is
12
2
If the number of firm




Using (7.11.)it is clear that for theentrepreneur owning a type 1 firm
( a2—10i0)2 U 2y9aa2
He is slightly better off than theaverage person; howmuch
depends on his aversion to risk (cx) and the varianceof his own
security.
If he screened, the value of hiswealth would go up by an
amount ,andhe could then completelydiversify, so
— cx2
(7.8)YcryZ l
assumption will be justified in the next section. The
basic argument is simple: if the fraction of shares retained by
the original owners is an observable variable, if the low productivity.
firms retained a smaller fraction thanA ,itwould signal to the
market that they were lowproductivity,and this would have a marked
effect on their market value.
The results would not be significantly affected if we assumed
that the original owners of poor quality firms retain a smaller
fraction of their shares.38a.
Under the assumption of (7.2), it does notpay him to undertake
the screening.
(b) The full information equilibrium. The relative price of the
two securities is 1'2 .Forthe upper group,
after paying for screening
2
— (-j)y.. —-X—.z c
and for the lower39.
—cx2
(7.10) -





Thus,it pays the individuals oftype 1 to screen. This
example illustrates several of the importantaspects of markets
with imperfect information:
(1) There may be multiple equilibria.
(2) Some of these equilibriamay be Pareto inferior to others.
In this example, it can be shownthat the no screening equilibrium
is pareto superior to thescreening equilibrium.
()Thetype 2 securities owners exertan externality on the
txp.Jsecuryowners. If all securities were good (type"1")
the expected utility of thetype 1 security holder would be
-exp(o1a)
In both the full information andno information equilibrium, the
type 1 individuals are worse off. On theother hand, the losses
to the type 1 individuals exceed thegains to the type 2 individuals,
relative to what they could have had ifall securities were of type 2.
This is obviously the case in thescreening (full information)
equilibrium, where in fact the type 2security holders are no better
of f than they would have been in theabsence of type 1 security
holders, but the latter are unambiguouslyworse of f:JaQ.
externalityis purely dissipatjye Buteven in the no screening








fora net loss of
-r octo
Matcjg.jcreenig
Tht example developed in some detail above involvedone group
of securities being unambiguously better thananother group. The now
example which we/present involves differences inopinions among
different individuals about what states ofnature are most likely
to occur; this in turn affects which securitiesmaximize ex ante
expected utility.
Consider a particular firm.It is known that it either
produces using technique A or technique B. Forsimplicity we
assume individuals are risk neutfal, but weassume individuals are
not allowed to sell securities short?
1
These assumptions may easily bemodified.There are three groups in the population; type A indiviciuais
believe that, if the firm produces using A, it will have a
very high profit, but if it produces using B, its profits
will be low; conversely, type B individuals believe expected
profits with B are high but with A are low.Type C
individuals believe that the two techniques have the same
expected profits.In the absence of information about which
technique is being employed, all individuals assume that there
isafifty—fiftychance that a particular technique is used.
More precisely, let llA(A beexpected profits iftechnique
A is used in the judgnent of person of type A, and be
the aggregate wealth of individuals of type A. There isan alterna-
tive investment opportunity (lecurity C) whdse 'epéctéd rettrn
is the sane in everybody's judgment.Then we assume
> > A <UA)
> > w3 <
< aC>t(A)
RB(A)÷1IB(B)<
Thus, in the absence of information, individuals of type A
or type B prefer security C to the given firm.The firm
will be entirelyowned by individuals oftype C.By
assumption,their wealth exceeds the value of the firm.
(The value of the firm will bek2.
q
-
whichis less than the aggregate wealth of type CIndividuals)
The remainder of the wealth oftype C individuals as well as
the wealth of type A and B individuals is invested intype C
securities.The expected income of individuals of eachtype
is
A A EY r*w -
B B
- EYr*c)
C C LY nr*t,j
Nowassume we have perfect information,e.g. everybody knows
that A was the technique used.Then type A individuals would
all purchase securities of the given firm.Butby assumption,
their aggregate wealth is insufficient tobuy all the
securities, so C is the "marginal purchaser".Hence the
valueofthe finn is unchanged at -Expectedincomes
arenowgiven by
-
4IIA(A)A A LI= r'u>r*ca
11(A)




Thus,there is a Pareto improvement: A isbetter off
-
andnoone is worse off (in an expected utility sense). If




fiC(AJ itis clearly worth procuring.Note, however, that although
this information has value, there isabsolutely no change in
the market value of the firm.Thus the firmwouldhave no
incentive to provide the information ——evenif it could do
so almost costlessly.Individuals of type A have an43.
incentive to get together, to form a "consumercooperative" to
procure the information; but this is likely to be impossible,
since it is difficult for individuals oftype A to identify each
other. (Thus, although there is a natural "producer"cooperative
for providing information by sellers ofsecurities, i.e. the firm
itself, there is no corresponding natural consumer cooperative.)
And even were it possible to identify who was in factan individual
of type A, there are all the classical publicgood (free rider)
problems which argue that there is likely to be underinvestment in
this type of information.i
fl.
VIII.Self-Selection Equilibria
We argued in the previous section thatthe original owners of
the more productive firms havean incentive to provide informationto the marketestablishing their productivity.There is, however,
a fundamental problem of credibility:
information suppliedby
(or paid for by) the firmis not likely to bebelieved. It is well
known that actions speaklouder than words; in therecent literature
on screening, actions which
convey information (e.g. about the
productivity of the firm) are referredto as Uf-seictiona;ic
(Stiglitz (1982). Anentrepreneur who is willing to holdon to a
large fraction of the shares of hiscompany may be conveying
information that he believesthe market isundervaluing his firm.
Of course, if investorscome to believe this, then firmswhich
are not productive mayattempt to imitate the moreproductive firms;
the share of the firmretained by the originalowners would not
then convey information. Thisdiscussion should make clearthat
analysis of self-selection equilibriais a fairly complexquestion.
Indeed, as we shall see, itmay not even be clear what theappropriate
notion of equilibri shouldbe.
The essentialProperty of a self-selection device isthat the relevant
cost curves (indifference curves) forone group differ from those of the
other. An increase in the share of thE firm retainedby thE original ownen
has a cost in the reduced
diversification (increased risk)which the
entrepreneur must bear. If,however, the market undervalue5 the
security, there is a gain: mean incomewill increase as the fraction
retained increases. Thus, theaQtcostto the more productive
firms is lower than to the
less productive firms, and itis this
difference which in somecircumstances may enable thefraction of
shares retained by theoriginal owners to serve asa self-selection
device.245.
To see this more formally, we return tothe simple model of
section 7.5. Letpdenote the price at which an owner ofa firm
of type i can sell his shares. Themean return of shares purchased
on the market is normalized at unity. In figure7.1 we have
depicted the individua]. indifference curves in(A,p) space
(where A is the fraction of the sharesretained)) Clearly,
d > >. <0as A<M(p)
where A*(p) is the optimal value of A.(See, e.g. equation 7.14.)
Moreover,
The owners of the less productivity (type2 firms) require a larger
increase, in the price to compensate them foran increase in the
fraction of the firm they retain.
Pooling equilibrium
Assume first that A is observable. Considerthe no information
equilibrium, when A1= A2(Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)refer to this a
a pooling equilibrium). Clearly, inequilibrium, p=l, and the optimal
value of A (from the point of view of themore productive firms) is
just A1
isthis, however, an equilibrium? Clearly, the good firmswould
like to signal that they are good. What wouldhappen ifonesuch
firmwere to announce that it was willing to sell a fraction A.at
a price p greater than 1, with the point (,p), locatedin the
shaded area in figure 7.1
,i.e.below type 2 individualsl
indifference curve, but above type 1 individuals,indifference curve.
An investor might be tempted to infer thatonly a type 1 entrepreneur,